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CASE COMMENTS
ment of the United States, and, therefore, they would not be able
to take an oath to defend the Constitution. In a similar vei, con-
scientious objectors, In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); and
members of organizations such as the I.W.W., In re Smith, 133
Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925); and the Christian Front, Applica-
tion of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (2d Dep't
1944), have been disbarred or denied admission to the bar be-
cause they could not conscientiously take the necessary oath. Our
courts are a bulwark of free people. Hence, it is obvious why the
officers of those courts, i.e., lawyers, could not advocate the over-
throw of that judicial system by illegal and unconstitutional meth-
ods. Even present communist members and members of the
Communist Party's allied organizations who admit their member-
ship are refused the license to practice law though they emphatically
deny they advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United
States by force and violence. Martin v. Law Society, [1950] 3
D.L.R. 173 (B.C.C.A.); Application of Patterson, 302 P.2d 227
(Ore. 1955).
There are some who would argue that there is no longer any
need for protecting the bar from communists and communist
lawyers, but so long as our judicial system is to administer justice,
it is necessary that its officers believe in its continued existence.
See Note, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 480, 506 (1953).
I. A. P., Jr.
CONS'rrUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIWV Es GATioNs-PERTiNENcE
AND SCOPE OF INQumh-Petitioner, before a House of Representatives.
sub-committee, refused to state whether or not he knew certain
named persons to have been members of the Communist Party,
claiming that the questions asked were outside the proper authority
of the committee. He was then cited for contempt of Congress and
the matter was referred to the courts; at the trial he was found guilty,
and conviction was affirmed. On certiorari, held, that the authorized
scope of the committee and its stated objects were too uncertain to
enable a witness to determine whether or not he could rightfully
refuse to answer questions on the ground of pertinence. Watkins v.
United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1957).
In a companion case, the Court held that lacking indication of
legislative desire for answers to the questions asked, a state attor-
ney-general-investigating by legislative direction-had no authority
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to question a witness concerning his associations, lectures, or beliefs;
and that conviction of contempt for refusal to answer such questions
was improper. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 77 Sup. Ct. 1203 (1957).
Both cases required consideration of pertinence of questions to
the investigating agency's authorized scope of inquiry with respect
to the limits inherent in the legislative process and those imposed
by the Bill of Rights. U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-VIII. These limits find
expression in judicial review of the contempt power of the legisla-
ture. E.g., In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). This power is
inherent in the legislative process. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat) 204 (1821). In both cases the Court was able to avoid
constitutional questions by statutory interpretation, indicating that
an indefinite authorization "insulated" the legislative body from the
witnesses. Watkins v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1188 (1957);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra.
Considering only the federal government, the fundamental
inherent limitation on legislative investigation is that Congress has
no general power to inquire into the private affairs of citizens,
although it may inquire into matters which are the proper subject
of legislation. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74, 50
A.L.R. 1 (1927) (dictum). In addition, while Congress may not
assume executive or judicial powers, inquiry into matters also
criminal is not forbidden. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263
(1929).
Limits imposed on investigations by the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech are not well defined. U. S. CoNsT. amend. I;
Note, 29 IND. L.J. 162 (1954). Courts will not decide a constitu-
tional question when there is another basis for decision. E.g., Res-
cue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). Such a basis
has been found in contempt proceedings. United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953). Refusal to answer a question posed by a legis-
lative committee is a misdemeanor, but only so when the question
is pertinent to the question under inquiry. 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2
U.S.C. § 192 (1952). By interpretation of this requirement, and
others not considered here, the Court may protect first amendment
rights without invoking them, as when 'lobbying activities" in an
authorized resolution was narrowly construed to place an alleged
contempt outside the scope of inquiry. United States v. Rumely,
supra.
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The scope of inquiry, then, must be defined in the committee's
authorization. United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956), 24 GEo. WASHL L. REV.
342 (1956). It must be for a proper legislative purpose. Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955). The committee must act only
within its authorized scope. United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp.
791 (D. Mass. 1956). General language in the authorization does
not permit inquiry except in the same general area as that specifically
set out. Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S. 376 (1928). Vagueness
in the resolution is a ground of defense available to a witness, since
it deprives him of opportunity to determine pertinence of questions
to the matter under inquiry. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
Pertinent, as used in the contempt sense, means pertinent to
the subject matter properly under inquiry and not merely pertinent
to the witness. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1954).
Pertinence is a broader term than relevance at common law. Town-
send v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 664 (1938). A question is pertinent if it leads from one perti-
nent phase of questioning to another. Wollam v. United States, 244
F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1957). Normally, pertinence is a matter of law.
Sinclair v. United States, supra. However, if it must be established
by evidence, it becomes a question for the jury. United States v.
Orman, supra. Pertinence may not be presumed. Bowers v. United
States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953). It is generally agreed that
it is the question that must be pertinent rather than the answer
sought. See Note, 70 -LH.v. L. Rv. 671 (1957). In all events,
however, to support a contempt conviction, the question must be
pertinent to a matter properly under inquiry. Marshall v. United
States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 938
(1950).
The present decisions are based on a sound foundation of
precedent; they establish no new principle of law, but only tighten
the previous requirements. On this basis legitimate legislative in-
vestigation need not suffer, provided only that the legislature define
and authorize the scope of inquiry on the basis of needed informa-
tion, and that the investigators confine their questions to those perti-
nent to the authorized scope.
R. G. D.
3
D.: Constitutional Law--Legislative Investigations--Pertinence and Sc
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1957
